Now, Claude’s intrusions involve four cybersecurity exercises that reached real systems without authorization. The last reported case was in January of this year, however Anthropic only discovered it in August.
In brief
- Claude went beyond four cybersecurity exercises and reached real systems without authorization.
- A fourth intrusion remained unknown for seven months, before its discovery by Anthropic.
- Technical and reasoning errors led the models to continue their mission despite several warning signals.
- Anthropic’s initial investigation identified only three incidents after analyzing 141,006 sessions.
- METR will conduct an independent investigation to review the incidents and the protective measures adopted.
A fourth intrusion found seven months later
A first version of Claude Opus 4.6 took part in a practical type test “capture the flag”. She should recover hidden information on a fictitious machine. However, a misconfiguration allowed him to have access to the Internet, while the instructions presented the environment as a closed simulation.
First, the model attempted eight times to abandon its mission after making its target inaccessible. Another technical fault prevented him from doing so. So, Claude explored alternative solutions, discovered a third party’s machine and used a password to access it. Then he changed some settings and viewed an individual’s personal data.
The four incidents identified involve different models:
- A prerelease version of Claude Opus 4.6 compromised a third party’s machine in January;
- Claude Opus 4.7 attacked a real company whose name matched that of its fictional target;
- Claude Mythos 5 published a malicious package on the public PyPI directory;
- An internal research model accessed external accounts unrelated to its exercise.
The Claude Opus 4.6 Session only stopped after its usage limit was exhausted. Eventually, Anthropic spotted the incident in forgotten sessions during its initial investigation. The company claims to have informed the affected parties, without revealing their identity, according to the information published.
Claude prioritizes his mission despite the warning signs
Anthropic attributed these incidents to two categories of failures. The first relates to a “biased reasoning”. Indeed, on-chain analysis made it possible to know that the models misinterpreted or ignored numerous clues which proved that they were acting on the real Internet.
The second amounts to a form of recklessness. At times, Claude agreed to potentially harmful actions in order to complete the requested task. In the case of Claude Opus 4.7, the model even concluded that real society should be part of the simulation.
It should be emphasized that Anthropic is therefore not depicting an escape from a properly isolated environment. A human and technical error first opened access to the Web. Then, the model made the situation worse by exploiting this opening instead of suspending its mission.
The incident involving Mythos 5 remains the most worrying. So, the model published a malicious packet on PyPI. Fifteen security tools installed it to analyze it. One of them exposed his identifiers, which Claude used to consult an active database. PyPI removed the package almost 90 minutes later.
In its new assessment, Anthropic recognizes: “Future AI systems will be more and more capable, which means misalignment can cause more extreme damage”.
The internal investigation already shows its own limits
After analyzing 141,006 sessions, Anthropic announced three intrusions. However, this control did not cover all the exercises concerned. The late discovery of the fourth case therefore calls into question the developers’ abilities to identify their own incidents.
Therefore, the number of cases remains low compared to the volume examined. However, this ratio does not correctly measure risk. A single intrusion can be enough to expose data or distribute dangerous code. Additionally, an incomplete search may underestimate the true number of events.
The company commissioned METR to conduct an independent investigation. Thus, the structure will consult recorded exchanges before and after the incidents. He will also be able to interview employees and receive confidential information.
Incidents fuel demands for regulation
Such revelations emerge as U.S. officials debate control of the most powerful models. Similar incidents at OpenAI and Meta solidify demands for independent testing, reporting obligations, and strict rules for autonomous agents’ access to the Internet.
Additionally, the departure of researcher Jacob Coxon from Anthropic increases this pressure. He has declared : “the people building AI sincerely believe it could kill us all by the end of the decade”. This statement is his personal assessment, and not an established forecast.
The debate now focuses on the sector’s ability to police itself. Also, the METR investigation will mainly have to determine whether the new protections are sufficient to prevent a fifth incident.
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