Syria has just fallen and that changes everything

The Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad is on the verge of collapse after 13 years of civil war. This spectacular acceleration of history could reshape regional balances.

A lightning offensive in Syria

The collapse of government forces happened with astonishing speed. The capture of Hama by the forces of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) by Mohamed al-Julani has opened a major breach, in an increasingly complex international context where the BRICS are now involved in the conflict in Gaza.

This advance directly threatens the vital connection between Damascus and the coastal governorates of Tartus and Latakia, where the strategic Russian bases of Hmeimim and Tartus are positioned.

Government defenses appear to be collapsing like a house of cardsunable to put up significant resistance. The capture of the Damascus suburbs is particularly revealing: this sector, traditionally ultra-defended by the Syrian army, was abandoned without significant combat.

The east of the country is already lost for the dietwith the emblematic fall of Palmyra. Druze rebels from the south are at the gates of Damascus, creating a pincer situation for the Syrian capital.

Damascus has just fallen: the end of the Al Assad regime has been recorded.

The Allies abandoned Bashar's Syria

The Assad regime finds itself in unprecedented isolation. The Russians, the historic pillar of Assad's maintenance in power since 2015, seem to have done the choice of disengagement. Their forces are repatriating their equipment to Tartous, without us yet knowing whether this is a tactical withdrawal or a definitive evacuation.

Iran, another major supporter of the regimeconspicuous by its absence. Rather than strengthening its presence, Tehran appears to be evacuating its nationals and officers. Iraqi Shiite militias, traditionally spearheading pro-Assad interventions, have turned around, possibly under pressure from American strikes.

Only Hezbollah would have sent some 2,000 fighters to Homs, a force clearly insufficient in the face of the surge of HTS forces.

This weakness in the response of the regime's traditional allies raises a question: Is it a material incapacity to intervene or a concerted strategic choice?

Al-Julani: the birth of a new leader in Syria?

Mohamed al-Julani appears as the central figure of this recomposition of the Syrian landscape. His journey is particularly interesting: formerly close to the Islamic State, he made a significant ideological evolution.

Over the past five yearshe endeavored to make the Idleb governorate a showcase of his governance capacities, seeking to present a more moderate image.

His diplomatic strategy current situation is remarkable: it multiplies the pledges of moderation, promising to protect minorities and not attack Russian interests.

Even Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, mentioned the HTS forces without labeling them terrorists, signaling possible international acceptance of Julani as the future Syrian leader.

A geopolitical upheaval

For Russia, the potential loss of the bases in Tartus and Latakia would represent a major blow. These facilities are crucial for Russian power projection towards Africa. Their loss would significantly reduce Russian capacity for influence in the region.

Israel's position becomes particularly delicate. The potential emergence of a hostile power on its borders, claiming the Golan, could push Tel Aviv to extend its buffer zone, in particular by relying on Druze forces.

Lebanon could become the next sticking point. The cutting of the land connection between Iran and Hezbollah, already compromised by Israeli actions in the Bekaa Valley, would become definitive with a power hostile to Damascus. This could precipitate an intervention by Julani in Lebanon, under the guise of “liberation”.

Iran: the big loser?

The apparent paralysis of Iran in the face of the collapse of its Syrian ally could reveal a deeper weakness. Years of international sanctions, repeated Israeli strikes in Syria and the attrition of the Revolutionary Guard forces appear to have significantly eroded Tehran’s projection capacity.

This situation remindsin certain aspects, the Soviet paralysis of 1989 in the face of the collapse of its East European satellites. The inability or refusal to intervene to save a historic ally could herald deeper upheavals within the Iranian regime itself.

Towards a recomposition of the Middle East

The speed of the Syrian collapse could have a domino effect across the entire region. Syrian Kurdistan finds itself in a precarious position, caught between Turkish ambitions and the rise of HTS. Erdogan's Turkey could seek to extend its influence, particularly towards the strategic city of Manbij.

Iraq could become the next theater of confrontation. The Sunni part of the country, historically resistant to the power of Baghdad, could be tempted by a rapprochement with a strengthened Sunni Syrian power. This prospect particularly worries Iran, which would see its regional influence further compromised.

This major reconfiguration of the Middle East occurs in a broader context of changing global balances. The apparent weakness of the traditionally dominant powers in the region (Russia, Iran) could open the way to new forms of influence and power.

The fall of the Assad regime thus marks the end of an era in the Middle East, opening the way to new regional dynamics, notably Russian-Turkish economic cooperation supported by the BRICS. The coming weeks and months will tell us whether this transformation leads to regional stabilization or, on the contrary, to new cycles of violence.