Ripple prepares XRP Ledger for quantum risk with a 4-step plan

Ripple has released a roadmap whose role is to make the XRP Ledger compatible with post-quantum signatures by 2028. Indeed, the project plans tests, a period of cohabitation between old and new systems, as well as a global migration of the network. However, this protection is not yet activated on the main network. Nor is any computer capable of calculating the private keys used to control XRP accounts.

Ripple organizes the migration of the XRP Ledger in four phases

As network activity explodes, Ayo Akinyele, Senior Director of Engineering at Ripple, explained in great detail this strategy. For him, the company wants to prepare the infrastructure before quantum computers pose an immediate threat.

The risk fundamentally lies in signatures based on elliptic curves. The XRP Ledger currently uses the secp256k1 and Ed25519 algorithms. Thus, a very powerful quantum computer would theoretically exploit a public key to find the equivalent private key. Then he would sign transactions in place of the owner.

Here are the essential steps of this program:

• The first phase provides for an emergency procedure in the event of a sudden breakdown of current cryptography;
• The second evaluates the risks, post-quantum algorithms and their consequences on performance;
• The third step must make current and post-quantum signatures coexist on test networks;
• The fourth aims for a general transition of the XRP Ledger no later than 2028.

This guidance document has been originally released by Ripple in April 2026. The company is working with Project Eleven on various models. Thus, the tests mainly concern validators, a post-quantum conservation portfolio as well as the behavior of new signatures under network usage conditions.

Ripple does not yet mention which final set of algorithms will be retained. The company is still testing many systems recommended by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. She wants to maintain a certain flexibility in order to be able to modify her method if a weakness appears.

Key rotation eases the transition without protecting the network

The XRP Ledger already has a function capable of simplifying the transition. An account can change its secondary authorization key without replacing an address or recreating its settings. The owner can therefore choose a new signature system while keeping the same account.

This ability does not, however, represent post-quantum protection. There XRP Ledger documentation attests that the network currently supports secp256k1 and Ed25519, two systems based on elliptic curves. New algorithms will need to be integrated before accounts are truly resistant to quantum attacks.

An account’s public key is visible on the blockchain when it signs a transaction. Such data does not present any danger with conventional computers. At the end of a possible “Q-Day”a hacker would however try to use it to reconstruct the private key.

Ripple is therefore examining a recovery mechanism for accounts still linked to old systems. A new solution relies on zero-disclosure proofs of post-quantum knowledge. They could allow a user to demonstrate that they controlled an old key without revealing it during migration. This avenue remains at the research stage.

Validators will need to approve the protocol modification

Ripple is not able to impose the transition on the entire XRP Ledger alone. Independent validators must also coordinate the adoption of an amendment that will add post-quantum signatures to network standards.

This modification also raises numerous technical difficulties. New keys and signatures are usually larger. They can increase storage and bandwidth requirements, but also slow down transaction monitoring. The tests must prove whether the XRP Ledger can maintain its performance despite this overload.

A more radical measure is planned in the emergency plan when quantum computers evolve faster than expected. The network would then refuse traditional signatures and force owners to transfer their assets to secure post-quantum accounts.

The progress made by artificial intelligence also complicates the choice of algorithms. During July, Anthropic’s Claude Mythos model detected a more effective attack against HAWK, a candidate for post-quantum signature status. Anthropic indicates that this discovery does not compromise any system currently in use.

This episode, however, reveals that an algorithm described as post-quantum must still resist human analyzes and research carried out using AI. The 2028 deadline will therefore depend on technical results, but also on the agreement of validators and the insertion of new signatures by wallets and exchanges.