Blockstream has just published a 131-page security analysis dedicated to SHRINCS, a signature system intended to protect Bitcoin against future quantum computers. The document, dated November 18, 2026, evaluates its cryptographic strength based on several mathematical assumptions. The first results are encouraging, but three conjectures remain to be demonstrated. The researchers are now asking the community to review their work before any use on the Bitcoin network.

In brief
- Blockstream publishes 131-page analysis on Bitcoin’s post-quantum security.
- SHRINCS displays a typical resistance estimated between 121.4 and 122.7 bits, under certain assumptions.
- Signatures remain voluminous and their security also depends on portfolio management.
Bitcoin: Blockstream unveils 131 pages on quantum security
Research into Bitcoin’s post-quantum security is advancing at Blockstream. On November 20, Bitcoin Magazine reported the publication of a 131-page technical analysis dedicated to SHRINCS. Mikhail Kudinov, a post-quantum cryptography researcher at Blockstream, presented this work with several collaborators, including Jonas Nick, the company’s research director.
The paper examines SHRINCS’ resistance to attempts to forge digital signatures. These signatures currently make it possible to prove that a user has the necessary keys to spend their bitcoins.
The problem comes from advances in quantum computing. A sufficiently powerful computer could one day find certain private keys from the public keys used by Bitcoin. This threat is already being debated. The CEO of Blockstream, Adam Back, notably estimated that the quantum risk for Bitcoin still remained remote.
SHRINCS offers an alternative signature method, relying on hash functions rather than the cryptographic operations currently used to authorize transactions.
Researchers estimate its typical security at between 121.4 and 122.7 bits. This level is close to the 128-bit objective retained in the technical specification. But the result depends on three mathematical conjectures that have not yet been proven. Kudinov himself recognizes that the document requires further independent evaluation.
Signatures up to 90 times larger
SHRINCS must also solve a much more concrete problem: the size of signatures. On Bitcoin, a Schnorr signature used with Taproot takes up 64 bytes. The SHRINCS specification provides for several configurations. Its compact method produces signatures between 548 and 4,619 bytes. An alternative solution, without state management, requires 5777 bytes.
In the latter case, the signature takes up approximately 90 times more space than a current Schnorr signature. The difference is considerable for a network whose block capacity remains limited.
Larger signatures can increase the weight of transactions and reduce the number of operations that can fit into a block, all else equal.
The technical choice involves another difficulty. SHRINCS notably uses single-use signature keys. When a wallet employs its compact method, it must keep an accurate record of keys already in use. If the same single-use key is used to sign two different messages, an attacker can potentially create a fraudulent signature.
The consequences can go as far as theft of funds. To avoid this situation, the researchers have planned a second method, which works without preserving this history.
It uses signatures of 5,777 bytes. A wallet restored from its recovery phrase could thus continue to sign transactions without risking reusing an old single-use key. This additional security is therefore paid for in space occupied on the blockchain.
Bitcoin still needs to resolve several issues before deployment
The release does not mean that SHRINCS is ready to be integrated into Bitcoin. The researchers caution that their analysis has not yet undergone sufficient independent review. The project also includes several experimental elements. The GitHub repository for the implementation developed at Blockstream explicitly states that the software is not yet to be used in production.
No deployment date on the Bitcoin mainnet has been announced. In particular, developers will need to verify the robustness of the demonstrations, test the performance of the system and determine how to integrate these signatures into the protocol rules.
Hardware wallet manufacturers will also have an important role. Cryptographic protection is not enough when the operation of the wallet itself introduces a risk of theft. This is precisely one of the difficulties of SHRINCS. The system seeks to reduce the size of signatures while maintaining a fallback method when key tracking becomes uncertain.
Another question concerns the capacity of Bitcoin. A signature of 5,777 bytes is approximately 5.6 kilobytes. For a single operation, this may seem limited. Multiplied by thousands of transactions, this difference becomes significant. SHRINCS therefore offers a compromise between security, available space and software complexity. For Bitcoin, Blockstream’s work represents a step forward in preparing for quantum risks. The 131 published pages provide a technical basis to examine, not already guaranteed protection. It will still be necessary to verify the demonstrations and convince the network developers before considering its adoption.
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