BRICS: Japan restarts Russian gross imports

On June 8, 2025, an oil tanker under American and European sanctions discreetly accosted in Japan, delivering Russian crude to a local refinery. This gesture, far from trivial, reveals a silent fracture in the western consensus on energy. While the G7 has been trying for two years to isolate Moscow, Tokyo favors its energy security. This episode, both symbolic and strategic, could well redraw the lines of a global energy order in recomposition.

Return under surveillance of Russian gross to Japan

While Donald Trump had mentioned 50 % taxes on Russian oil, Japan has imported a cargo of crude for the first time in more than two years. Delivery was made by the ” To travel “a tanker punishable by both the United States and the European Union, which makes the operation particularly notable.

The ship accosted on June 8, 2025 in an installation of the company Taiyo Oil, which has confirmed having bought Russian crude.

It is the Sakhalin Blend, a type of crude extracted in the Russian Far East, in connection with the Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 energy projects. If the operation remains exceptional, it challenges several concrete elements:

• Japan had not imported Russian oil since 2022, when it had aligned itself with the G7 sanctions after the invasion of Ukraine.
• Brut comes from a strategic region (Sakhalin Island) where Japan still has interest in gas projects via Mitsui and Mitsubishi.
• The delivery was made by a ship explicitly sanctioned by the Western powers, which could theoretically pose legal or diplomatic problems.
• The operation seems to have been made possible by the specific derogations that Japan retains to guarantee its energy security, in particular with regard to supplies linked to Sakhalin.

These elements underline an increasing tension between geopolitical commitments and energy interests, in a context where supply autonomy becomes a vital issue for Tokyo.

Between political alliances and energy realities

The delivery operation, although discreet, is already the subject of questions within diplomatic and energy circles. It occurs even that Tokyo remains officially aligned with Western sanctions.

No official reaction was issued by the Japanese authorities. However, this import is motivated by the need to maintain the stability of the supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG), in particular in connection with the infrastructures and projects of Sakhalin.

If cargo concerns oil, it could be used indirectly to preserve Japanese strategic interests in gas projects by avoiding offending Russia, a flagship country of the BRICS Alliance.

This decision is not without risk for the image of Japan on the international scene. Although Western sanctions against Russia are mainly aimed at reducing Moscow's energy windfall, Japan had already obtained certain derogations to continue to import Russian LNG.

This time, it is clearly oil, transported by a sanctioned ship. In addition, this could fuel diplomatic tensions, especially with Washington, Tokyo's main strategic ally. Delivery, although punctual, could also pave the way for similar initiatives from other Asian countries, thus weakening the anti-Kremlin energy front.

In the medium term, can Japan permanently reconcile its political commitments with its energy constraints? If other cargoes follow, it might mark the start of a tacit flexibility of prohibitions on Russian oil in Asia, in a context where current energy income can no longer support military spending. For the time being, this operation remains an officially tolerated exception, but it reveals the growing tensions between diplomatic ethics and energy reality, in a world where alliances vacillate in the face of economic survival imperatives.